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within the aims of the theory, but 
requiring no choice between conflicting 
moral demands. One could, of course, 
point out that this does not overcome the 
philosophical problem of grounding a set 
of prescriptions, since the injunction to 
maximise overall preference-attainment 
is simply another prescription on a par 
with those being treated by the theory as 
mere preferences. Nevertheless, the 
economic approach appears on the face 
of things to embody a powerful 
conception of legitimacy, whereby 
outcomes will be shaped by the 
distribution of preferences across the 
population.
Similarly, the economic approach 
attaches no importance to the 
conventional causal judgments studied by 
Hart and Honore, treating only 'but for' 
causation as raising a genuine causal
o o
issue. This 'causal minimalism', as Hart 
and Honore style it, flows from the 
aggregative approach of the economist, 
wherein every legal dispute involves a 
conflict about the allocation of resources, 
rather than a dispute about responsibility. 
Hence the economic approach seeks to 
avoid the seeming arbitrariness of the 
need to identify taken-for-granted 
baselines as a foundation for judgments 
of causal responsibility.
The most striking feature of law-and-
o
economics to the outside observer, 
however, is its radical departure from the 
ordinary language and conceptual 
structures of private law. Traditional legal 
concepts such as those of fault, 
responsibility, and causation have focused 
upon the rights and wrongs of past 
transactions between the plaintiff and
defendant. All such backward-looking 
conceptions are abandoned by the 
economic approach, or are treated as 
entirely secondary to forward-looking 
aggregative questions of economic 
efficiency. This abandonment of 
traditional legal ideas has been the 
principal feature of economic analysis 
provoking (by negative reaction) the 
emergence of rival, non-economic, 
theories of private law.
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Economic theories of law attach little 
importance to the distinction between 
private and public law: the forms of 
private law are regarded as specific 
instrumentalities, differing from those of
o
public law, but to be justified ultimately 
by reference to their consequences. By 
contrast, some of the currently influential 
non-economic theories attach great 
importance to the distinction: indeed, 
they take the demarcation of a distinct 
realm of private law as central to their 
whole enterprise. Private law is conceived 
of as a body of principles regulating 
justice between individual citizens and 
embodying a conception of corrective 
justice; while public law is regarded as an 
implementation of the state's distributive 
and aggregative projects. Consequently, it 
is suggested, political and moral 
disagreements find expression in public 
law, while private law is the manifestation 
of an apolitical and relatively uncontested 
conception of human agency and 
responsibility. In this way the theories 
seek to overcome the problem of moral 
pluralism.
The problem of causal indeterminacy
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has been less explicitly addressed by non- 
economic theorists, and this omission 
poses some serious problems. For 
example, many such theorists analyse 
private law in terms of a model of 
corrective justice drawn from Aristotle. 
Their general concern is to present 
corrective justice as more than the simple 
restoration of a distributively just 
situation upset by a wrong of some sort: 
corrective justice, it is suggested, has a 
status that is autonomous and 
independent of distributive justice. 
Corrective justice expresses certain 
conceptions of agency and responsibility 
that are neutral between distributive 
schemes. Such theorists might reasonably 
point out that the common sense 
judgments of causal responsibility 
analysed by Hart and Honore are, as the
DEMARCATION OF PRIVATE LAW
Private law is conceived ot as a body of 
principles regulating justice between 
individual citizens and embodying a 
conception of corrective justice; while public 
law is regarded as an implementation of the 
state's distributive and aggregative projects.
authors themselves explain, fundamental 
to our whole notion of human identity 
and agency. Specific problems arising 
from our awareness of the plasticity of 
human arrangements should not, 
therefore, be too lightly confused with a 
fundamental erosion of notions of causal 
responsibility. ©
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Criminal Procedure & Investigations Bill — for better or for worse?
by Sheilagh Davies
The Criminal Justice Act 1987 (CJA 
1987) hailed a new era. Obligations 
were imposed on prosecution and 
defence to collaborate at an early stageJ o
to identify issues, serve documents, 
prepare schedules and deal with points 
of law. The preparatory hearing was 
introduced. The intention was better 
case management, to smooth the path 
towards the presentation of trial and 
make the system generally more 
efficient.
INCREASE IN APPEALS
As an idea, this was a good one but its 
operation was at variance with what 
Parliament intended. The Act made 
provision that the party who lost on a 
particular point at a preparatory hearing 
could take that point on appeal. This 
caused a rush of applications to the Court 
of Appeal with counsel doubtless feeling 
that they had to take the point so as not 
to be disadvantaged later. In a number of
decisions the court ruled that the legal 
arguments did not form part of the 
preparatory hearing. Arguably, the Court 
of Appeal was looking for clarification, 
but the reality is that there have been a 
number of inconsistent decisions that 
have defeated Parliament's intention for 
smoother case management. If the Court 
of Appeal was looking for an 
administrative way of lowering theJ o
number of appeals they had to force the 
ball back into the court of the Executive.
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Let us examine whether the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Bill has 
assisted the position or not.
The main provisions of the bill relate 
to prosecution and defence disclosure 
and the responsibilities of the police with 
regard to material for the purposes of 
prosecution disclosure. The proposed 
clauses were significantly amended by 
Standing Committee B and I deal with 
them in that amended form. Those 
provisions of the bill which affect serious 
fraud trials are contained within Sch. 2. 
This proposes to amend the CJA 1987 
and deals primarily with preparatory 
hearings.
DISCLOSURE
Disclosure remains a thorny subject 
giving rise to disparate views. It is 
addressed in the bill in a way that is giving 
defence lawyers cause for concern. 
Whilst there remains an obligation on the 
prosecution to disclose 'material of all 
kinds' which specifically includes both 
information and objects of all 
descriptions, the obligation only relates 
to that material which, in the opinion of 
the prosecutor, might undermine the 
case for the prosecution against the 
accused. It is argued that this is a 
retrograde step, representing a distinct 
shift away from the disclosure guidelines 
achieved after a number of miscarriages 
of justice. It is a subjective test that 
demands not only an objectivity of the 
highest degree but an insight the 
prosecutor, through no fault of his own, 
may not have. How can he necessarily 
know what material will assist the 
defence in their task to undermine the 
prosecution case?
DISCLOSURE
Disclosure remains a thornv subject givingJ 3 o o
rise to disparate views. It is addressed in the 
bill in a wav that is giving defence lawyers
J o o J
cause for concern.
Once there has been primary 
disclosure under cl. 3, cl. 5 goes on to7 o
provide that where the section applies the 
defence must give a defence statement to
O
the prosecutor and, if appropriate, to the 
court setting out in general terms the 
nature of the defence, the matters upon 
which he takes issue with the prosecution 
and, in relation to each such matter, the 
reasons therefor.
Clause 7 deals with secondary 
disclosure, the requirement to disclose
any material not previously disclosed to 
the accused which might reasonably be 
expected to assist the defence as 
disclosed by the defence statement. The 
prosecutor is required to keep under 
review, during the course of the trial,
' o T
whether any additional material needs to 
disclosed because it falls under either 
head.
Critics of the bill claim that cl. 5 places 
an unfair burden on the defence, 
requiring far greater disclosure of them 
than that required by the prosecution. I 
am not sure this is right. Any party may 
depart from the case he disclosed   albeit 
the judge or (with his leave) any other 
party to the proceedings may comment 
adversely upon it. The judge has a wide 
discretion in deciding whether or not to 
give leave and in what circumstances.
PREPARATORY HEARINGS
Section 7 of the CJA 1987 deals with 
preparatory hearings in the case of 
serious or complex fraud. It is proposed 
to amend s. 7 by the removal of subs. (3), 
(4) and (5) i.e., those concerning the 
powers of the judge in relation to the 
orders he can make at a preparatory 
hearing. Essentially of course he can still 
make any order he thinks appropriate, 
but separate and specific provision is no 
longer made for him to order the 
prosecution or defence to prepare and 
serve any documents that appear 
relevant. As for the extent to which a 
judge may be reluctant to make orders   
or can be persuaded not to   only time 
will tell. One can imagine judges taking 
different views but at this stage the 
impact of this amendment can only be 
speculative.
The new s. 9A deals with orders before 
the preparatory hearing and the amended 
s. 9(10) provides that an order made 
under this section shall have effect during 
the trial unless it appears to the judge, on 
application made to him during the trial, 
that the interests of justice require him to 
vary or discharge it. Effectively this 
means that while an order made is 
mandatory the position remains wide 
open. I wonder how many instances 
there will be of judges being asked to 
reverse their earlier orders. At least it 
might relieve some pressure from the 
Court of Appeal! Departing from a 
disclosed case is now arguably easier with 
the amended s. 10.
The bill proposes that judges are given 
a discretion to order a preparatory
RECOURSE TO TRIAL JUDGE
I wonder how many instances there will 
be of judges being asked to reverse their 
earlier orders. At least it might relieve 
some pressure from the Court of 
Appeal!
hearing in any case which is potentially 
complex or lengthy. The powers the 
judge may exercise and the criteria for 
exercising them are similar to those in 
existence for serious fraud trials, as 
amended by the bill. The underlying 
reasoning is to crystallize the issues and 
there are proposals which would give the 
right to comment in the event of 
departure from a disclosed case. The 
judge may vary any order or ruling on 
application made to him on the grounds 
that the interests of justice require him to 
vary or discharge it but there is no right 
of interlocutory appeal. The question is 
surely: what do these proposals really add 
to the existing pleas and directions 
hearings (PDHs), now universally in 
operation? They add little but the PDH is 
at risk of becoming as unwieldy as some 
preparatory hearings in serious fraud 
trials but without the advantage of 
interlocutory appeals.
WHAT'S NEW?
The question is surely: what do these 
proposals really add to the existing pleas 
and directions hearings (PDHs), now 
universally in operation?
REPORTING CONDITIONS
One area where there is felt to be 
improvement in the bill itself is in 
relation to reporting conditions. The 
basic tenor is for there to be no reporting 
during the trial except where the judge 
permits it. These restrictions will not 
apply to the reporting of information 
such as the nature of the charges and 
details of witnesses but otherwise place 
much tighter restrictions on reporting.
An overall verdict: another statute to 
add to the wealth of legislation in the last
o
few years. Some good proposals, some 
not. The same old story! ®
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